By Mosisa Aga

Part II: The Rise of OMN and Qeerroo

From “Oromo First” to OMN

Jawar Mohammed’s political trajectory changed dramatically after an interview on Al Jazeera’s The Stream in July 2013. During the interview, he was asked whether he considered himself “Ethiopian first” or “Oromo first.” Without hesitation, he replied, “Oromo first,” adding that Ethiopia had been imposed upon him.

The significance of this interview lay not simply in what Jawar said, but in who was saying it. Similar views had long been expressed by Oromo nationalists. However, Jawar had previously earned considerable support from Ethiopia’s so called “unity camp” because of his strong criticism of the OLF. When he publicly embraced an “Oromo First” identity, many of those supporters felt betrayed. At the same time, many Oromo nationalists who had once viewed him with skepticism began to see him in a different light. The interview therefore did more than generate controversy. It fundamentally reshaped Jawar’s political constituency.

This shift proved to be a turning point in his career. Within a relatively short time, Jawar transformed from a controversial critic of the OLF into one of the most popular public figures among Oromo youth. His growing influence did not arise solely from the interview itself. Rather, the interview became the catalyst that allowed him to connect with a rapidly changing political mood among young Oromos.

Jawar quickly built on this momentum by organizing a series of “Oromo First Community Engagement” meetings across the Oromo diaspora. Around the same time, several Oromo activists had already begun discussing the establishment of an Oromo satellite television station modeled partly after other Ethiopian diaspora media initiatives. Among those involved in these early discussions were Dr. Solomon Ungashe, Mohammed Ademo, Tigist Geme, Kadiro Elemo, Ahmed Yasin, and others. Jawar later joined these efforts, and his rapidly growing popularity became an important factor in mobilizing public support and fundraising for what would eventually become the Oromia Media Network (OMN).

The creation of OMN was therefore the result of both a collective effort among Oromo activists and the unique momentum generated by Jawar’s rising public profile. While many individuals contributed to the vision and early development of the organization, Jawar’s ability to attract large audiences and mobilize financial support played a significant role in accelerating its establishment and shaping its early public identity.

Looking back, the “Oromo First” campaign and the establishment of OMN marked the beginning of a new phase in Jawar’s political career. They provided him not only with a larger audience but also with an institutional platform that would greatly expand his influence during the years leading up to the Oromo Protest.

The Emergence of Qeerroo Bilisummaa Oromoo

The emergence of Qeerroo Bilisummaa Oromoo was one of the most important developments in recent Oromo political history. Known formally as the National Youth Movement for Freedom and Democracy (NYMFD), Qeerroo grew into the most visible and influential Oromo youth movement during the years leading up to the Oromo Protest of 2014 to 2018. Understanding its development is essential because it helps explain how the protest acquired an organizational structure long before it attracted international attention.

Qeerroo emerged in 2011, drawing inspiration in part from the youth movements of the Arab Spring in North Africa and the Middle East. At first, many observers dismissed it as another diaspora initiative with little influence inside Oromia. That assessment soon proved to be mistaken. Within a short period, Qeerroo established a genuine grassroots presence, particularly among university and college students.

Soon after its founding, Oromo student protests began appearing across several higher education institutions. On April 7, 2011, students at Mizan Tepi University demonstrated following the public announcement of Qeerroo’s formation. Security forces responded with arrests and violence. Similar protests and government crackdowns followed at Haramaya University, Arba Minch University, Jijjiga University, Fiche Preparatory School, Adama University, and other institutions during the months that followed.

These protests continued intermittently from 2011 through 2014. During this period, Qeerroo gradually evolved from a student initiative into a broader organizational network linking activists across Oromia. At the same time, government repression intensified, further strengthening the movement’s sense of shared purpose and identity.

From its public statements, publications, and activities, Qeerroo maintained a close ideological and organizational relationship with the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). This relationship was reflected in the communication channels of both organizations. The OLF radio station, Sagalee Bilisummaa Oromoo (SBO), regularly reported on Qeerroo activities, while Qeerroo’s media platforms frequently covered OLF statements and events. Although this relationship was widely recognized among Oromo activists and observers, OLF leaders generally avoided discussing it publicly, most likely because openly acknowledging such ties carried significant political and security risks.

Although often described as a youth movement associated with the OLF, Qeerroo rapidly developed its own public identity and organizational capacity. Within only a few years, it had become more visible than the OLF itself in many parts of Oromia. Through its website and other media platforms, Qeerroo built an extensive communication network capable of collecting and distributing information from across the region with remarkable speed.

Whenever major events occurred, including student demonstrations, arrests, school dismissals, land disputes, or the displacement of farmers, Qeerroo’s media platforms were often among the first to report them. The speed, consistency, and geographic reach of these reports suggested that the movement had established a broad network extending throughout Oromia and into Oromo communities beyond the region.

The widespread protests of 2014 demonstrated the strength of that network. Following the government’s crackdown on demonstrations against the Addis Ababa Integrated Development Master Plan, Qeerroo documented hundreds of arrests and numerous deaths. In one report, the organization compiled and published the names of 61 students who had been killed and 903 others that have been arrested, together with information about their schools, fields of study, and hometowns. Gathering and verifying such information from across Oromia under conditions of intense government surveillance required a level of organization that few outside observers had fully appreciated at the time.

This point is historically significant. By the time the Oromo Protest gained international attention and Jawar Mohammed emerged as its most recognizable media figure through OMN, Qeerroo had already established an organizational identity, an extensive communication network, and a strong presence on the ground. In other words, the movement’s organizational foundation preceded its international visibility. Recognizing this chronology is essential for understanding the relationship between Qeerroo, OMN, and the public narratives that would later develop around the Oromo Protest.

By 2014, Qeerroo had become far more than a student movement. It had developed an organizational structure, an information network, and a presence throughout Oromia. Yet one important question remained unresolved. How would this largely underground movement interact with the Oromo media institution that was rapidly becoming the voice of the Oromo struggle? That question would shape the next chapter in the history of the Oromo Protest.

In Part III, we will examine the evolving relationship between OMN and Qeerroo, and Jawar Mohammed’s role in shaping both that relationship and the public perception that followed.