By Mosisa Aga
Part V: The Atlanta Convention, Another Controversy
Competing Visions of Leadership and Representation
Throughout the first four parts of this series, a recurring pattern has emerged. As Jawar Mohammed’s public influence grew through OMN and social media, it repeatedly brought him into conflict with existing Oromo organizations and leadership structures. We examined the controversy surrounding his article declaring the OLF “damaged beyond repair,” the disputes over OMN’s establishment and leadership, his relationship with the Qeerroo movement, and the events surrounding the Grand Rally of August 6, 2016. Whether readers agree with my interpretation or not, these episodes provide important historical context for understanding the debates that continue today.
This part examines another episode that many Oromo activists and observers view as following a similar pattern: the formation of the Oromo Leadership Convention (OLC), commonly known as the Atlanta Convention. Once again, the central issues were leadership, organizational ownership, transparency, and the influence of a powerful media platform.
The idea of organizing a broad Oromo national convention reportedly originated with a group led by Professor Asafa Jalata. He was then the chairman of the Macha-Tulama Cooperative and Development Association USA Inc., a non-profit civic organization based in Washington, D.C., that supports the Oromo diaspora and humanitarian needs. For several months, the group worked to organize an inclusive gathering that would bring together Oromo organizations, civic associations, scholars, religious leaders, and other respected members of the community. During this process, Professor Asafa invited Professor Ezekiel Gebissa, then President of the Oromo Studies Association (OSA), to join the effort.
According to individuals familiar with these events, Professor Ezekiel entered the process with an established network that included several civic organizations, religious associations, the Oromo American Citizens Council, and OMN, where Jawar Mohammed was a leading figure. At that stage, when the two groups were still working together, the proposed gathering was tentatively called the Oromo National Convention (ONC).
According to Professor Asafa, when representatives of the two groups first met to develop a framework for the proposed national convention, Professor Ezekiel indicated that his group had already prepared a draft proposal. The other organizers agreed to review the document and offer suggestions in the hope of developing a broadly accepted framework. Professor Asafa recalls that the draft focused primarily on building a democratic Ethiopia, while giving insufficient attention to the Oromo struggle for self-determination and sovereignty, the historical role of the OLF in the development of Oromummaa and Oromo nationalism, and the legacy of Ethiopian colonialism. According to his account, when he proposed revising the document to address these issues, Professor Ezekiel and those associated with him chose to continue independently. That separation ultimately led to the organization of the Oromo Leadership Convention (OLC), in which Jawar Mohammed became a leading figure.
Professor Asafa further describes the developments as follows:
“Many leaders of Oromo civic institutions opposed what they viewed as an effort to shift the focus away from the Oromo national struggle. In response, they established Global Gumii Oromia, an organization inspired by the traditional Gumii Gayyoo assembly of the Borana Oromo. According to its founders, the organization was created to strengthen Oromo society by empowering intellectuals, professionals, and community members in the diaspora, expanding grassroots institutional capacity, and addressing the cultural, political, and social challenges facing the Oromo people.”
Some participants questioned why OMN, a media organization, was included while other Oromo media outlets were not. Others objected that important decisions, including the convention’s date and location, had been made before receiving the approval of the broader organizing committee. As tensions escalated, respected Oromo elders reportedly attempted to mediate the dispute between the two groups. Around the same time, Professor Ezekiel sought the endorsement of the Oromo Studies Association (OSA) for the proposed convention. At the time, I was serving on the OSA Board and closely followed these developments. After careful deliberation, the Board declined to endorse or participate in the convention because serious disagreements had already emerged among the organizers.
About a month before the planned gathering, the collaboration collapsed. Professor Ezekiel and his associates separated from Professor Asafa’s group, dropped the original name, Oromo National Convention (ONC), and announced a new gathering under the name Oromo Leadership Convention (OLC), scheduled for November 11 through 13, 2016, in Atlanta. The convention received extensive promotion through OMN and Jawar Mohammed’s social media platforms, giving it unprecedented exposure within the Oromo community.
Several major Oromo organizations, including OSA, the OLF, the Macca Tulama Association, and the Oromo Community Organization of North America, and others ultimately declined to participate. To the best of my knowledge, several widely respected Oromo scholars, including Professor Asafa Jalata, Professor Mohammed Hassan, Professor Asfaw Beyene, Professor Guluma Gemeda, and many others, also chose not to attend. Critics argued that many organizations were not meaningfully consulted before the convention was announced and that key decisions, including the agenda, speakers, and draft resolutions, had already been made by a relatively small group before broader participation was sought.
Whether these decisions reflected effective leadership or an effort by a small group to take control of a broader national initiative is for readers to judge. What is clear, however, is that the Atlanta Convention became one of the most controversial political episodes within the broader Oromo movement during the years of the Oromo Protest. Instead of strengthening unity, it deepened existing divisions. Disagreements between the convention organizers and the OLF became increasingly public. Allegations surrounding a leaked strategy document, accusations that the convention was intended to sideline both the OLF and Qeerroo, and competing interpretations of its true objectives ensured that the Atlanta Convention remained one of the defining controversies of that period.
The Aftermath
Opposition to the Oromo Leadership Convention began almost immediately after it was announced. One of the earliest public criticisms came from twelve well known young Oromo activists, who addressed an open letter to Professor Ezekiel Gebissa. They argued that the proposed convention lacked transparency, had not been organized through an inclusive process, and was moving too quickly for an initiative claiming to represent the Oromo people. Despite these objections, the convention proceeded as scheduled in Atlanta on November 11 through 13, 2016.
The convention took place without the participation of several major Oromo organizations. Most notably, neither the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) nor Qeerroo, two forces widely credited with leading and sustaining the Oromo Protest, participated. Supporters of these organizations emphasized that individuals attending the convention should not be viewed as representing their respective institutions. At the same time, competing narratives emerged regarding the Oromo Protest itself. Supporters of the convention emphasized the first anniversary of the second wave of Oromo Protest that started in Ginchi town, while many within the OLF continued to regard the student uprising that began in Ambo in 2005 as the defining beginning of the modern phase of Oromo resistance.
The controversy intensified on the second day of the convention when a poem vilifying the OLF was read from the stage and broadcast live by OMN. Many OLF members and supporters viewed the poem as an attack on the organization’s historical role and leadership. The broadcast quickly fueled intense debate across Facebook, Paltalk discussion rooms, Oromo websites, and other media platforms.
Another controversy emerged when a document began circulating online that came to be known as the “leaked document.” According to individuals familiar with the events, the document originated from within the Atlanta Convention rather than being fabricated afterward. It proposed creating a “Supreme Council” to direct the Oromo Revolution under a single leader, identifying Bekele Gerba as the proposed overall leader and Jawar Mohammed as the next in command. Jawar Mohammed publicly rejected the document, describing it as the work of “the enemy” and insisting that it had never been presented to the convention delegates. Although questions remain about the document’s official status, including whether it was a formal proposal, an internal draft, or a document that was never adopted, its circulation intensified concerns among many Oromo activists about the possible concentration of political authority in the hands of a small group. Reflecting those concerns, many critics on social media began referring to Jawar Mohammed by the nickname “Ayatollah,” a label intended to portray him as seeking to centralize authority in a manner they considered authoritarian.
Viewed from the perspective of 2026, the Atlanta Convention represented far more than a disagreement over a single meeting. It reflected fundamentally different visions of leadership, representation, and ownership of the Oromo Protest. Supporters viewed it as a timely effort to provide leadership during a critical moment in Oromo history. Critics, however, believed it represented an attempt to establish a new political center while major Oromo organizations remained outside the process.
Subsequent events demonstrated that the reality was more complex than either side anticipated. Political movements rarely follow a linear path, and revolutions seldom unfold as their participants, or their observers, expect. The debates surrounding the Atlanta Convention became only one chapter in a much longer and still evolving political story.
Taken together, the episodes examined throughout this series reveal a recurring pattern. Whether the issue involved the OLF, OMN, Qeerroo, or the Atlanta Convention, the underlying disputes consistently centered on the same fundamental questions: Who speaks for the Oromo people? How should leadership emerge? What is the proper relationship between political organizations, civic institutions, youth movements, and influential media platforms? These questions neither began with the Atlanta Convention nor ended there. They continue to shape Oromo political discourse today and will likely remain subjects of debate for years to come.


























