By Mosisa Aga

Part IV: The Grand Rally and the Struggle for Leadership

Two Centers of Leadership

By the summer of 2016, a significant gap had developed between Jawar Mohammed’s public image and the internal organization of the Qeerroo movement. Because he frequently appeared on OMN broadcasts with the OLF flag and was one of the most visible voices of the Oromo Protest, many ordinary Qeerroo members assumed that he was not only connected to the OLF but also part of the senior leadership of Qeerroo. According to individuals involved in the movement, however, the reality was different. While ordinary members of Qeerroo communicated with OMN regarding information intended for public release, the leadership did not consider Jawar part of the movement’s organizational structure and withheld sensitive operational details from him.

This distinction became consequential during the planning of the Grand Rally of August 6, 2016, which many former participants describe as Qeerroo’s most ambitious coordinated action up to that point. The plan required months of preparation and strict confidentiality. According to individuals familiar with the events, the operational details were inadvertently shared with Jawar by a lower-level member of the movement who believed Jawar was a legitimate Qeerroo and OLF leader. Those who later investigated the matter concluded that he acted out of that belief rather than malicious intent.

Five days before the planned demonstrations, Jawar publicly announced the Grand Rally through his media platforms. Former Qeerroo participants maintain that the announcement came earlier than intended and reduced the movement’s ability to launch a sudden, coordinated protest across Oromia before government forces could prepare a response. The disclosure also created confusion within the movement, as Qeerroo leaders initially suspected that the information had been leaked from within their own senior ranks. After further inquiry, they concluded that the source was a lower-level organizer who had shared the information without malicious intent because he believed Jawar was part of the movement’s leadership. I have chosen not to disclose that individual’s identity because he is still living in Ethiopia, and revealing his name could expose him to unnecessary security risks while adding little to the historical analysis.

The situation became even more complicated. In the days leading up to the Grand Rally, Jawar issued additional public instructions through Facebook and OMN that, according to former Qeerroo participants, differed from the operational guidance circulating within the movement.

The most significant difference concerned road closures. According to former Qeerroo participants, organizers on the ground had instructed protesters to block major roads leading into towns before demonstrations began. This was not intended as a symbolic act of civil disobedience, but as a defensive strategy developed during years of protest. Organizers believed that once federal police and Agazi special forces reached protest locations, they often responded with live ammunition, causing large numbers of deaths and injuries. By delaying their movement, protesters hoped either to prevent these forces from reaching demonstrations or to postpone their arrival until protests had largely concluded. Many participants viewed local security forces differently, noting that some local officers, who were often Oromos themselves, were sometimes reluctant to use deadly force. In their view, the greatest danger came from heavily armed federal forces deployed from outside the area.

Jawar, however, publicly urged protesters not to block roads. During an OMN broadcast on August 5, 2016, the day before the Grand Rally, he explained that this approach was based on assurances he believed had been secured through discussions with elders and members of the diplomatic community. I reproduced the following quotation from a draft I prepared in 2020, when the broadcast was still publicly available on YouTube. The original video has since been removed, and the link is no longer active. In that broadcast, Jawar stated:

“Tomorrow’s rally is instructed to be held under strict discipline. This means there is no closing of roads. We have communicated our plans to the Ethiopian government through the elders and through the diplomatic community. Because we trust you, we promised these disciplines would be followed. We warned the government not to use force. Our elders also appealed to the government. International diplomats likewise urged restraint. Oromo people do not break promises. If the government fails to keep its promise, we will proceed to the next step.”

Jawar’s public appeal rested on a different assumption, namely that prior communication with government officials through elders and diplomatic channels would reduce the likelihood of government forces using deadly force against protesters. Many protesters appear to have understood this as an indication that the authorities had, at least implicitly, agreed to allow peaceful demonstrations to proceed without a violent crackdown. Whether that interpretation reflected Jawar’s intention is impossible to determine. What became clear after August 6, however, was that those assurances provided no meaningful protection for protesters. Government forces responded with overwhelming force, demonstrating that informal assurances from the regime could not substitute for the security measures that Qeerroo organizers believed were necessary.

This distinction is historically significant because the debate was not merely about a single tactical decision. It reflected two different assessments of how the government would respond to mass protests: one based on years of experience that emphasized self-protection, and another based on the belief that communication and international attention could help restrain state violence. The tragic events that followed remain central to the continuing debate over which assessment better reflected the realities of the time.

The Grand Rally: The Human Cost

By almost any measure, the Grand Rally of August 6, 2016 marked one of the defining moments of the Oromo Protest. Never before had demonstrations spread so widely and so simultaneously across Oromia in a single day. From major cities to small towns, and even many rural communities, Oromos mobilized around a common objective at the same time. The extraordinary scale of the protest reflected the combined efforts of many actors. It demonstrated the organizational capacity that Qeerroo had developed over several years, while also highlighting the important role of OMN, Jawar Mohammed, and numerous Oromo activists who helped publicize the movement and mobilize support both inside the country and throughout the diaspora. In that sense, the Grand Rally was not only a mass protest but also a remarkable display of unity, coordination, and collective action.

At the same time, it became one of the bloodiest episodes in the history of the Oromo Protest. Hundreds of thousands of people participated across Oromia, and government security forces responded with overwhelming force. Three days after the rally, the Oromia Support Group summarized the magnitude of the crackdown in a letter addressed to the United Nations Human Rights Council, dated August 9, 2016:

“Following the political turmoil and mass unrest ignited in Ethiopia… Within three days alone at least 400 Oromo civilians were killed. More than 5000 injured while thousands were disappeared in the form of arrest and transferring to detention centers, such as Dhidhessa, Tolay, and Wurso and to several tens of hidden torture locations in Oromia. The detainees are held incommunicado and tortured by state security forces into ‘confessing’ to anti-government protestors.”

The human cost was devastating. Those who were directly involved in organizing the movement continue to debate how much the premature announcement of the rally and the conflicting public instructions affected what followed. No one can say with certainty how different the outcome would have been. However, many participants believe these actions disrupted months of planning and weakened the movement’s ability to protect protesters.

One former Qeerroo leader who coordinated activities on the ground and wanted to be anonymous recalled the reaction among organizers after the rally date was announced prematurely:

“We had worked on this plan for months and believed it had the potential to fundamentally change the political situation. Our preparations were still incomplete when Jawar publicly announced the rally five days ahead of schedule. We were shocked and left with no clear course of action. Since millions had already received the announcement through OMN, issuing different instructions would only have created greater confusion. We therefore chose to remain silent and do our best to communicate with organizers on the ground. In our view, the government’s security forces were given valuable time to prepare, and the conflicting instructions contributed to the heavy loss of life.”

Similar concerns were expressed by others who say they maintained direct contact with the movement’s leadership during that period.

Gashu Lamessa, a member of the Executive Committee of the OLF who says he maintained direct communication with the central Qeerroo leadership during that period, argues that the consequences of the premature announcement extended well beyond revealing the date of the protest:

“Using Jawar’s announcement, the regime was able to disrupt much of Qeerroo’s preparation, especially plans involving members of Qeerroo working within the police, the OPDO, and other government institutions. The objective was not merely to organize a one-day protest. The goal was to bring about political change through a popular uprising. Unfortunately, that plan was aborted.”

Teshome Dime, chairman of the International Qeerroo Support Group in Washington, D.C., who says he remained in regular communication with organizers inside Oromia, offers a similar assessment:

“Jawar’s instruction not to close roads cost us hundreds of lives. In Nekemte alone, thirty-four Qeerroo were killed. In Awaday, seventeen more lost their lives. Overall, more than one hundred Qeerroo died that day.”

The precise number of casualties from the Grand Rally remains disputed. What is not disputed is the scale of the tragedy. Contemporary reports consistently indicate that demonstrations took place in more than 200 towns and cities across Oromia, including Finfinnee (Addis Ababa), making the Grand Rally one of the largest coordinated protests in Oromo history.

From a historical perspective, the significance of the Grand Rally extends beyond its casualties. The events revealed the challenges that arise when a decentralized grassroots movement and its most influential media platform operate under separate centers of influence. One organized the movement on the ground, while the other shaped its public image before millions. When those roles became misaligned, the consequences extended beyond public perception and affected the course of events itself.

Whether Jawar’s actions ultimately changed the outcome of the Grand Rally remains a matter for readers to evaluate. What is clear is that August 6, 2016 marked a turning point in the relationship between OMN and many within the Qeerroo leadership, illustrating how tensions between media influence and organizational leadership can shape both history and its interpretation.

Throughout this series, a recurring pattern has emerged. As Jawar Mohammed’s public influence grew through OMN and his extensive social media presence, movements and initiatives that originated elsewhere increasingly became identified with him in the public imagination. This recurring pattern lies at the heart of the controversies explored throughout this series over leadership, ownership, and historical credit.

In Part I, we examined Jawar Mohammed’s criticism of the OLF and his evolving relationship with the organization. In Part II, we explored his rise through OMN and the debates surrounding the development of that platform. In Part III, we examined how his growing media influence contributed to the widespread perception that he was the leader of Qeerroo, despite the movement’s existing organizational structure. In Part IV, we analyzed the events surrounding the Grand Rally of August 6, 2016, and the competing claims about media influence and organizational leadership.

Taken together, these episodes raise a broader question: how does a public figure acquire leadership status within a decentralized movement, and what happens when media influence becomes more powerful than formal organizational structures?

In Part V, we examine another episode that reflects this same tension: the Oromo Leadership Conference. We explore how an initiative that began among Oromo professors and intellectuals became closely associated with Jawar Mohammed, and how critics argue that OMN and his social media influence reshaped the ownership, direction, and public perception of the conference.